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SOCIAL WELFARE, HUMAN DIGNITY, AND THE 
PUZZLE OF WHAT WE OWE EACH OTHER 
AMY L. WAX∗ 
In a recent book about the American anti-poverty movement, Joel 
Schwartz argues that the moral improvement of the poor was a central 
goal of anti-poverty reformers in the 19th and early 20th centuries. 
Although moral reform was considered intrinsically valuable, it was 
also thought to be instrumental. The emphasis on the character and 
personal conduct of the poor during this period was directed primarily 
at “reduc[ing]. . . dependence on either charity or government relief.”1 
The vices these reformers decried—“indolence, intemperance, 
improvidence—were attacked because of their role in fostering or 
exacerbating dependence,” and good behavior “was largely 
synonymous with behavior furthering self-reliance.”2 The twin aims 
of reducing dependence and fostering self-reliance account for many 
features of the early anti-poverty movement in this country. Those 
goals shaped the moral outlook of reformers, informed their 
recommendations, and determined which efforts were endorsed to 
help the less fortunate. 
Anti-poverty policy has come a long way in the past century, in 
some ways returning full circle to its moralistic roots but in others 
departing from them never to return. There has been increased 
willingness recently, at least in some quarters, to decry “dependence” 
on the government in the form of reliance on cash entitlement 
programs or handouts. That willingness has found concrete 
expression in the reforms enacted in the Personal Responsibility and 
Work Opportunity Act in 1996, which imposes strict time limits and 
work participation requirements on recipients of public aid. But a 
century of theory and politics has transformed the call for reduced 
dependence—at least in its public guise—into one that is less 
moralistic and more pragmatic. That transformation reflects a deep 
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1. JOEL SCHWARTZ, FIGHTING POVERTY WITH VIRTUE: MORAL REFORM AND 
AMERICA’S URBAN POOR, 1825-2000, at 7 (2000). 
2. Id. 
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ambivalence about public moralism generally and moral prescription 
specifically.3 It is also rooted in a growing conceptual uncertainty 
about the roles of dependence and self-reliance in a modern, market-
driven society. 
 As Alan Wolfe documents in his book One Nation, After All, 
moralism—and especially public moral exhortation—has fallen out of 
fashion over the past 50 years.4 Very few public figures are willing to 
assert unequivocally that some ways of life and some types of 
character are “better” than others, to identify particular values as 
central to the good life, or to tell others which personal mores they 
should adopt. The stance translates into unease about holding up the 
so-called bourgeois values—those values associated with the 
Protestant work ethic—as the ones the poor should strive to adopt. 
Although welfare reform efforts have spawned some (mostly private) 
programs that attempt to get the poor to adopt habits that will help 
them be more economically successful (including the very practices 
associated with the Protestant ethic), the government rarely endorses 
or “preaches” bourgeois values to the poor outright, and certain of 
those values—such as sexual continence, cleanliness, marital fidelity, 
and frugality—are not considered fit subjects for official (or 
unofficial) public exhortation. 
Furthermore, the very idea of economic self-reliance has become 
the target of a sustained, multi-pronged attack. Old guard proponents 
of welfare rights have long cast aspersions on the idea of economic 
“self-sufficiency,” arguing that the notion is an incoherent and cruel 
conceit in the context of an intricate and intrinsically interdependent 
system. For some, the principle sources of poverty are obviously 
“structural” rather than “personal.” For others, the lack of rhyme or 
reason in the rewards that markets assign to participants and the key 
roles played by luck and unearned endowments in determining 
economic success fatally undermine the ideological basis for 
valorizing “self-reliance.” Practical economic realities of competitive 
employment markets also play a role in this skepticism. The 
intransigence of low pay for unskilled workers has forced an 
acknowledgment that good habits and conscientious efforts may not 
always be enough to guarantee workers’ economic self-sufficiency. 
 
3. See generally ALAN WOLFE, ONE NATION, AFTER ALL: WHAT MIDDLE-CLASS 
AMERICANS REALLY THINK ABOUT GOD, COUNTRY, FAMILY, RACISM, WELFARE, 
IMMIGRATION, HOMOSEXUALITY, WORK, THE RIGHT, THE LEFT, AND EACH OTHER 
(1998). 
4. Id. 
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 The general antipathy to public moralism, along with doubts about 
whether the economic independence of workers is either coherent or 
achievable, have taken their toll. The result is that the behavior and 
personal failings of the poor are de-emphasized, and the importance 
of good moral character to economic success is downplayed rather 
than trumpeted even by those most eager to reduce economic 
dependency. Reducing reliance on government handouts is depicted, 
at least for mainstream political consumption, as a goal primarily to 
be effected by wise policy design and proper administration, rather 
than by personal moral reform. Moreover, in recognition of the very 
real difficulties unskilled persons have in making ends meet, the goal 
for many of the poor—at least in practice—is no longer complete 
self-reliance. Although many former recipients of welfare have left 
the rolls voluntarily and assistance has been withdrawn from others, 
welfare reform has seen a proliferation of programs designed to 
supplement and support recipients’ work efforts. Between the 
alternatives of welfare or work lies a realm of welfare plus work in 
which many of the poor have come to rest, at least for the time being. 
This essay seeks to rescue the goals of economic self-reliance and 
independence from those who would discredit those objectives to cast 
aspersions on work-based welfare reform and endorse a return to 
unconditional redistribution.5 These voices repeatedly stress that no 
member of society can possibly hope to achieve self-reliance in the 
sense of complete personal and economic independence from others. 
Those who advance these critiques ask, in effect, “What is so wrong 
with dependence?” After all, everybody’s doing it. Children are 
dependent on parents and caretakers; stay-at-home moms on 
husbands; widows on their husband’s social security benefits; 
students on government loans; homeowners on mortgage interest tax 
deductions; and the idle rich on inherited trust funds. Every living 
person is dependent on the efforts and innovations of generations 
past. Indeed, everyone currently alive is in some sense dependent on 
everyone else in that virtually no one alone can supply what he or she 
uses and needs in everyday life. Moreover, everyone looks to the 
government to provide collective goods, basic infrastructure, and 
protection from force or fraud. In short, dependence is everywhere. 
Since we accept these interrelationships as unobjectionable and in 
many cases desirable, it is difficult to say what is wrong with 
 
5. See, e.g., LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP: TAXES 
AND JUSTICE 76-95 (2002). 
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dependency as such. Ergo, there is no principled basis for objecting to 
the dependence of the poor, including single mothers now subject to 
work requirements under the federal Temporary Assistance for Needy 
Families program.6 The very same arguments can be restyled, ceteris 
paribus, as attacks on the notion of “self reliance.” No one is “self-
reliant” in the sense of being able to do without others’ efforts or 
resources. Hence the notion of “self-reliance” is a chimera that cannot 
stand as the touchstone for public policy in this area or any other. 
In its avatar in the realm of political theory, this line of reasoning 
starts with an attack on the notion of personal desert. Someone is 
ordinarily thought to “deserve” credit or reward for the products of 
his efforts. But almost no one produces anything alone, and 
everyone’s performance depends on others. Because it is difficult to 
calibrate individual contributions to output, it is difficult to argue that 
individuals “deserve” the compensation they receive for particular 
jobs performed. The impossibility of parsing out personal credit for 
production compounds the arbitrariness of market structures. Markets 
seem unfair because they assign rewards based in large part on 
endowments (such as looks or talent), or the vicissitudes of demand, 
for which individuals cannot claim credit. These insights fuel a 
rejection of economic individualism and the embrace of a holistic 
view of society, which sees all outcomes as ultimately collective and 
all production as, at bottom, a group effort. This holistic view, which 
goes along with the notion that no one can make an elemental claim 
of entitlement to his earnings in a modern economy, suggests that the 
very idea of individual desert is incoherent.7 
Yet another expression of this view begins with an attack on the 
distinction between the public and private spheres. Legal theorists 
such as Cass Sunstein note that the private exchanges and agreements 
comprising the market economy depend on the collective 
maintenance of public institutions and the enforcement of rules of 
contract and tort. Likewise, the existence and integrity of private 
property depend on the government’s willingness to protect the 
security of property rights. According to this view, it is not possible to 
identify a pre-existing “baseline” state of affairs that pre-dates the 
 
6. For examples of arguments in this ilk, see generally EVA FEDER KITTAY, LOVE’S 
LABOR: ESSAY ON WOMEN, EQUALITY, AND DEPENDENCY (1999); Martha A. Fineman, 
The Nature of Dependencies and Welfare “Reform,” 36 Santa Clara L. Rev. 287 (1996); 
Martha Minow, The Welfare of Single Mothers and Their Children, 26 Conn. L. Rev. 817 
(1994). 
7. See Samuel Scheffler, Justice and Desert in Liberal Theory, 88 Cal. L. Rev. 965 
(2000). 
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creation of an effective governing structure and the enforcement of 
legal rules. It follows that no distribution of wealth or resources can 
be regarded as a natural or “pre-legal” entitlement. All allocations are, 
in some sense, the creatures of the community because they cannot be 
maintained without the community’s help and support. 
This line of reasoning is enlisted to discredit the longstanding 
distinction between positive and negative rights and to defend 
distributive programs against libertarian claims of private entitlement. 
The logic goes like this: what the government creates and supports it 
is free to disturb.8 That everyone is in some sense dependent on the 
government for the resources at his disposal means that there is no 
principled limitation on redistribution of resources from the “haves” 
to the “have-nots.” Since no one is exclusively responsible for 
producing what he possesses, it follows that the government can 
reallocate those possessions to others as it chooses. Because there is 
no defensible, systematic connection between effort and reward, there 
is no basis for complaining of transfers to those who work less hard, 
or even not at all, and no basis for holding up economic 
“independence” as a morally praiseworthy goal. Pragmatic concerns 
alone limit what the government can and should do in the realm of 
resource distribution. 
Finally, the voices of feminist theorists can be heard in a similar 
refrain. Feminists frequently make the point that every person’s 
efforts, and the rewards that follow, ultimately rest on someone else’s 
contribution. The care received by individuals in childhood from 
parents and others is indispensable to their ability to generate 
resources or to contribute to the social product. Because no one alive 
has failed to benefit from others’ care—which has been rendered to 
them, in effect, free of charge—no one can claim entitlement to the 
full value of what he or she produces. By focusing on the 
pervasiveness of dependency within families, and in particular the 
ineluctable dependence of children on parents, feminists cast 
aspersions on the very possibility of self-sufficiency. Moreover, in 
their emphasis on the web of interdependencies and the role of 
domestic, unpaid “care work” as the precondition for all production, 
feminists implicitly repudiate the market as the sole test of value. This 
implies that the distribution mandated by the market is not inviolate 
and further buttresses the case for a free hand in redistribution to the 
 
8. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 873 (1987); 
DAVID KELLEY, A LIFE OF ONE’S OWN: INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND THE WELFARE STATE 
(1998); MURPHY, supra note 5. 
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“non-working” poor. In sum, because “self-reliance” is not only 
regarded as incoherent, but also as deeply antithetical to their interests 
and values, feminists are hostile to its role as a motivating objective 
of public policy. 
Indeed, many feminists go further in contending that the failure to 
redistribute resources generated within markets to those outside it—
including the single mothers and children who were formerly the 
recipients of unconditional largesse—is itself unjust. In their attempt 
to broaden the category of persons who are regarded as “deserving” 
of society’s approbation and material support, feminists note that 
welfare work requirements slight the kinds of domestic and 
caretaking tasks traditionally performed by women. Because many 
nonworkers with whom the welfare system is concerned are 
caretakers of young children, critics maintain that welfare work rules 
threaten to burden women disproportionately and to discourage the 
performance of non-monetized domestic functions. Indeed, the crux 
of the debate over how the welfare system should treat “caretaking 
units”—usually single mothers and their children—centers on what 
should count as “work.” The oft-heard claim is that caretaking 
performed without pay is no less socially useful than work performed 
for wages and should therefore be rewarded. Society should offer 
collective support to those who care for others.9 In making these 
arguments, feminists attempt to draw strength from the observation 
that society sanctions, and even approves, economic dependence 
within traditional families, including the dependence of homemaker 
mothers on breadwinner husbands. They ask why welfare mothers’ 
dependency on the government should be eliminated but the 
dependency of wives and mothers—who perform the very same 
domestic tasks—should be preserved. Likewise, no voice is raised 
against non-working, widowed mothers receiving social security 
benefits on the accounts of their deceased or disabled breadwinner 
 
9. See generally ANN ALSTOTT, NO EXIT: WHAT PARENTS OWE THEIR CHILDREN 
AND WHAT SOCIETY OWES PARENTS (forthcoming 2004); SHIRLEY P. BURGGRAF, THE 
FEMININE ECONOMY AND ECONOMIC MAN: REVIVING THE ROLE OF FAMILY IN THE 
POST-INDUSTRIAL AGE (1997); ANN CRITTENDEN, THE PRICE OF MOTHERHOOD: WHY 
THE MOST IMPORTANT JOB IN THE WORLD IS STILL THE LEAST VALUED (2001); MARTHA 
ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY, AND OTHER 
TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 213-17 (1995); KITTAY, supra note 6; Martha 
Nussbaum, Disabled Lives: Who Cares?, N.Y. Rev. Books, Jan. 11, 2001; Elizabeth 
Anderson, What is the Point of Equality, 109 Ethics 287 (1999). For a cogent critique of 
the feminist “ethic of care,” see WILL KYMLICKA, CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL 
PHILOSOPHY: AN INTRODUCTION 398-422 (2d ed. 2002). 
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spouses.10 Many of these women do no work in the paid economy and 
are thus no more “self-sufficient” and no less dependent than single, 
never-married mothers on welfare. Yet the public is far more 
forgiving of “dependence” for the former than the latter circumstance. 
The arguments rehearsed above turn on a basic reductio ad 
absurdum: since no one is entirely self-sufficient and many are 
completely dependent on others, how can self-sufficiency be 
demanded of recipients of public aid? The contention is that there is 
no principled way to distinguish, either in degree or in kind, among 
those who rely on other persons’ efforts and resources. It follows that 
there is no basis for distributive policies that accord different 
treatment to people who work and those who do not. 
Despite its ostensible defiance of common sense—and its rejection 
of everyday political instincts—this line of reasoning is taken 
seriously by many. It cannot be dismissed out of hand and, indeed, 
poses an important challenge to work-based welfare reform. It must 
be acknowledged that the proponents of this view make a valid point 
in one respect: dependence and self-reliance are terms that are often 
used carelessly by those hostile to economic redistribution. Viewing 
these states as absolutes rather than as matters of degree creates an 
opening for those who would discredit the commonsense 
distinctions—made frequently by ordinary people—that justify 
imposing welfare work requirements. 
The challenges and examples that are routinely invoked to 
disparage calls for self-sufficiency and economic “independence” 
suggest that the defense of welfare reform must take a more nuanced 
form. The simpleminded shorthand of the announced objectives—
abolishing dependency, achieving self-sufficiency—are politically 
useful in the age of sound-bites and brief attention spans. But the 
concepts in their unembellished form are vulnerable to attack. If the 
welfare reform project is sound and worthy—which this author 
believes it is—then a more conceptually coherent defense of recent 
changes in policy should be available. The question is, how can that 
defense be constructed? 
A careful reading of Joel Schwartz’s book on the history of poor 
relief reveals that the moral reformers of the past understood and 
anticipated the critiques of the simple-minded exhortations of self-
reliance and independence that troubled so many “liberal” champions 
of the poor today. These reformers understood very well that the term 
 
10. See, e.g., Minow, supra note 6. 
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“self-reliance” was not to be taken literally, but rather was a 
shorthand for a particular type of constructive role in community and 
economic life. They knew as well that all persons in society are in 
some sense “dependent,” or, more accurately, interdependent. Thus, 
achieving complete “self-reliance” and eliminating “dependency” 
wholesale are impossible and, indeed, ultimately incoherent 
objectives. The false dichotomy between dependence and 
independence does violence to what supporters of the poor aim to 
achieve. Rather, the concepts of dependence and self-reliance must be 
understood as having a “social meaning” that does not rest on 
conceptually pure absolutes, but rather on the fulfillment of normative 
expectations regarding conduct and participation in social and 
economic life. 
Champions of welfare reform thus cede no important ground to 
opponents by acknowledging that self-sufficiency is never complete 
and that economic independence for poor families—as for everyone 
else—cannot be all or nothing. Yet they must continue to insist firmly 
that this provides no warrant for returning to the failed experiments of 
the past. Reformers must stress the simple truth that economic 
independence and self-sufficiency are matters of kind and degree, and 
that meaningful and justifiable distinctions between types of 
dependency can and must be made. The fact that self-reliance can 
never be complete does not make it an unworthy or unimportant goal; 
nor does it undermine the value of striving to increase our efforts to 
become economically less dependent. The fact that self-support can 
never be absolute does not mean it should not be maximized as much 
as possible. The fact that dependency is a fact of life, and is 
sometimes unavoidable or even desirable, does not mean that 
dependency should be indulged or accepted in all cases. Admittedly, 
this more qualified and complicated stance, although responsive to the 
realities of economic life, renders arguments in favor of welfare 
reform harder to make and demands a more nuanced theory. There is 
no avoiding, however, the need to take these qualifications into 
account. 
How might more effective arguments for minimizing economic 
dependency and maximizing self-sufficiency be constructed? One 
approach would look to the distinctions ordinary people make 
between constructive citizenship and social parasitism. The challenge 
is to give the idea of constructive citizenship definite and rigorous 
content—content that can serve as a practical and useful guide to wise 
policy and that can also withstand theoretical attacks that seek to 
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discredit work-based reforms. That challenge can be met, in my view, 
by making use of the concept of conditional reciprocity. 
I have previously explored the idea of conditional reciprocity as a 
principle of social organization that commands widespread support in 
the United States and in modern industrial societies. It is generally 
acknowledged that people cannot always achieve complete self-
sufficiency and that there are occasions when individuals may call 
upon help from others. The collective, through government and 
private charity, stands willing to pledge support to its members during 
periods of economic misfortune or distress.11 In exchange, however, 
group members are regarded as owing a duty not to call upon public 
aid unnecessarily. The expectation is that people will strive to achieve 
self-support through their own reasonable efforts in the labor market 
and will fall back on group assistance only if they are unable to attain 
self-sufficiency or fall short through no fault of their own.12 
Conditional reciprocity as an animating principle for social welfare 
policy offers advantages over a one-dimensional and absolutist 
commitment to economic self-reliance. First, it makes room for the 
undeniable reality that individuals are interdependent in myriad 
ways—the very reality that makes simplistic stress on the goal of 
economic “independence” problematic and vulnerable to attack. The 
insight that individual effort, and the fruits of that effort, depend on 
the past and present contributions from others is in no way 
inconsistent with a reciprocal ideal. Rather, that ideal acknowledges 
the importance of the collective and assigns a role to group support. 
But the reciprocal ideal incorporates the understanding that group 
vitality depends critically on establishing ground-rules for the give 
and take of group living. Those rules are necessary to minimize unfair 
and destructive free-riding, which are inimical to the group’s 
continuing economic health and survival and the willingness of 
members to participate. For this reason, many societies have 
recognized the duty of the able-bodied to contribute to self-support as 
a pre-condition to looking for material assistance from the group. 
Second, conditional reciprocity, in reflecting commonplace views 
about welfare, desert, dependency, blame, and socially constructive 
roles, maps onto the political consensus behind welfare reform. Public 
 
11. See generally STEVE FARKAS ET AL., THE VALUES WE LIVE BY: WHAT 
AMERICANS WANT FROM WELFARE REFORM (1996); MARTIN GILENS, WHY AMERICANS 
HATE WELFARE: RACE, MEDIA, AND THE POLITICS OF ANTIPOVERTY (1999). 
12. See Amy L. Wax, Disability, Reciprocity, and Real Efficiency: A Unified 
Approach, 44 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1421, 1428 (2002). 
03-37 WAX 12/10/2003  1:32 PM 
110 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy [Jrnl Volume 
opinion polls show that voters are not unequivocally opposed to 
economic redistribution. Rather, they are willing to spend money—
often a lot of money—to help move persons from welfare to work. 
They are far less willing to provide public funds to help those who 
make no socially acceptable effort. 
Third, the paradigm also helps explain the difficulties posed by 
“hard cases” and borderline categories—such as single mothers of 
young children—which generate so much ambivalence, confusion, 
and controversy in the welfare policy arena. In addressing those “hard 
cases,” the ideal helps us understand that some issues admit of no 
eternally valid “right answers” but require ongoing sensitivity to 
social context, conventions, and expectations concerning what 
constitutes a “reasonable” effort or contribution on the part of various 
individuals within society. Conditional reciprocity makes room for 
shifts over time in notions of what individuals owe to each other as 
conventions and ideas about reasonable effort respond to changed 
circumstances. In some cases, such as how to deal with single 
mothers, logic chopping and conceptual analysis from first principles 
is not very helpful in resolving the issue of how social resources 
should be applied since conventional expectations surrounding work, 
motherhood, and reproduction have evolved in complex ways. The 
reciprocity paradigm takes account of that evolution and provides a 
framework for pragmatically assessing competing factors in 
determining whether mothers should be expected to work and under 
what circumstances. 
Finally, conditional reciprocity can accommodate the economic and 
social reality, which reflects the operation of real world labor markets, 
that not everyone can achieve self-sufficiency and economic 
independence despite reasonable efforts. In those circumstances, the 
reciprocal ideal mandates that the government provide social and 
financial assistance with the ultimate goal of making up the difference 
between what individuals can earn on their own and what is necessary 
for a reasonably dignified existence. The goal is to allow everyone 
who works to achieve a basic, minimum standard of living. The idea 
is also consistent with policies, such as transportation and child-care 
subsidies to working families and the Earned Income Tax Credit, that 
are designed to “help those who help themselves.” These policies 
have, if anything, grown in importance as welfare reform has 
proceeded. 
The reciprocal ideal, by eschewing absolutes and refusing to 
hypostatize the polar extremes of self-sufficiency and dependency, is 
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thus better equipped to deal in principled ways with attacks on work-
based welfare reform that are premised on the argument that, because 
economic dependence is pervasive, the government acts arbitrarily in 
seeking to reduce or penalize the dependence of the poor on 
government help. The paradigm of conditional reciprocity shows that 
not all forms of dependence are equivalent and that the government’s 
interest in minimizing economic dependency among the non-working 
poor is not arbitrary at all. By making the offer of group assistance 
conditional on the individual’s “best efforts,” this principle helps 
explain why some forms of economic dependence are regarded as 
benign, or even desirable, while others evoke disapproval. It also 
helps shed light on various aspects of the politics of social welfare 
programs. 
Social security for the elderly and programs for the disabled, for 
example, are famously popular. Both of these programs pay benefits 
to individuals who have performed a minimum amount of work in the 
paid economy and have paid some portion of their wage into a 
collective fund over time. In the case of the elderly, social security is 
generally considered a government-administered insurance program 
in which individuals put aside money for their own retirement. 
Although the view of social security as analogous to private insurance 
is an unrealistic conceit—since the program operates on a highly 
redistributive pay-as-you-go basis with recipients drawing out far 
more than the present value of what they paid in—the underlying 
intuition behind the commonplace view comports with a reciprocal 
ideal: elderly individuals are regarded, through past efforts, as having 
“earned” the right to a minimally decent level of support from society 
for their remaining years on earth. The operation of the reciprocity 
paradigm in this case, however, is a mixed blessing. Indeed, this 
notion hinders attempts to scale back social security benefits to 
relieve the burden on a shrinking population of working-age adults 
and to put the program on a more actuarially sound basis. 
The situation is similar for disability insurance programs: 
individuals are regarded as entitled to support from the collective 
when a disability renders them unable to support themselves. Indeed, 
entitlement to disability benefits through, for example, the federal 
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program is not regarded as 
dependent on any past or present contribution or work history. The 
willingness to extend public support to the medically disabled 
responds to the realization that most people are disabled through no 
fault of their own. The reciprocity paradigm only requires individuals 
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to attempt to support themselves through work if they can. That is, 
even the condition of reasonable effort is, in effect, conditional. The 
group is willing to help persons who cannot work productively so 
long as that limitation is due to a condition outside their control.13 
Old age insurance and disability benefits programs also provide 
support for dependent family members, wives, and widows, 
regardless of whether those beneficiaries work in the paid economy. 
Yet those payments are politically popular and fail to elicit the degree 
of voter hostility that has been directed towards programs that pay 
benefits to non-working single mothers and their children, such as 
Aid to Families with Dependent Children. Why does the public smile 
on benefits for a (non-working) widow of a disabled or deceased 
worker but frown on payments to a single never-married mother even 
though both are dependent on government “handouts” and neither 
contributes to self-support through paid employment?14 Is the best 
explanation, as some have suggested, hostility to the poor or simple 
racism? Conditional reciprocity casts doubt on this uncharitable view. 
The contributions of workers that entitle them to draw on public funds 
in the event of inability to work does not just extend to individuals, 
but is regarded as covering their immediate families. Because a 
worker’s efforts are designed to support and protect his kin, the group 
is willing to pledge to take on the responsibility when the worker is 
no longer able. Key to that willingness is the understanding that 
private, consensual reciprocity within families is benign and even 
desirable. Non-working wives are regarded as having engaged in a 
voluntary—and presumably valuable—private exchange of services 
with their working husbands. The fact that each member of the couple 
is willing to continue with the arrangement shows that each is making 
a positive contribution to the other. In the economists’ parlance, the 
readiness to engage in the voluntary exchange of resources and 
services indicates that the deal is Pareto-superior for both parties. By 
definition, such family arrangements do not resemble the type of “free 
riding” that past societies took pains to minimize in order to maintain 
stability and survival. Rather, these are private deals for ongoing 
mutual gain, generating net utility, well-being, and value. Although a 
non-working wife in a traditional breadwinner family is thus 
 
13. To be sure, disability benefits are sometimes forthcoming for conditions to 
which the individual sufferer contributed through carelessness or poor habits. As a 
reflection of the public’s unease about such aid, the law has been changed in recent years 
to cut back, for example, on benefits for those addicted to drugs and alcohol. 
14. See Minow, supra note 6 at 826-31. 
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“dependent” on her husband for financial support, her husband is also 
dependent on her for services and affection. The “dependency” of the 
homemaker wife in traditional married couples thus is very different 
in its social consequences and effects from the dependency of non-
working individuals (and their children) on the group as a whole. 
This logic can be extended to the provision of survivor’s and 
widow’s benefits under social security, with the additional 
understanding that the exchange inherent in the relationship takes 
place through a transfer of resources over time. The breadwinner 
works and makes contributions to the Social Security fund, but part of 
what a breadwinner “insures” against—in the sense of establishing his 
claim on a minimum social quid pro quo—is the destitution of his 
beloved family members. That is, what a husband “buys” through the 
system is the right to transfer some of his entitlement to minimum 
support to his spouse after death. The benefits paid to a wife—which 
allow her to refrain from working—can thus be seen as a property 
right to the husband. In any event, that transfer is not regarded as an 
instance of “free riding” by the widow on society as a whole. Rather, 
the widow has “carried her weight” by occupying her role within the 
reciprocal and consensual structure of family exchange. This logic is 
also pertinent to the tolerance—albeit with greater ambivalence—of 
individuals who live off inherited wealth. Although the idle rich make 
no positive contribution through their own work or effort, they do not 
call unnecessarily upon the group for collective support. Rather, they 
are the lucky beneficiaries of a private transfer of wealth that has 
nothing to do with free riding on the group. 
 Viewing the structure of welfare as rooted in the historical 
conditions that enabled voluntary cooperative arrangements for 
mutual support to survive and thrive explains much about attitudes 
towards different types of dependency and why attempts to equate 
them are rejected by most voters. The examples given above illustrate 
that non-work (or failure to work for pay) is not objectionable as 
such. Work on the market is not the absolute value or the ultimate test 
and dependency is not absolutely proscribed. Rather, the goal is to 
avoid the unnecessary expenditure of group resources set aside to 
insure against misfortune or emergencies. Individuals who ask for 
support from the group as a whole must make, or have made, an effort 
to support themselves, or must provide (or have at some point 
provided) something valuable, either to the public as a whole or to 
other private individuals who are willing to engage with them in 
exchange. Alternatively, individuals must have an excuse—such as 
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inability due to a medical condition—for failure to fulfill these 
expectations. In short, every person must somehow “pull his load,” 
and no one is allowed a “free ride.” 
This rule of thumb is not without ambiguity. That ambiguity 
accounts in part for shifting policies regarding public financial 
support for mothers of young children. As already noted, feminist 
critics of welfare reform object to a narrow definition of social 
contribution that regards work for pay as the only basis for desert. 
They insist that mothers of young children are providing “value 
added.” Those who urge social support for caretaking, however, must 
supply a theory of compensation or social reciprocity that disposes of 
demands to support a range of other non-market activities. Graffiti 
artists, gardeners, school volunteers, and subway buskers would all 
lay claim to subsidy. Yet we harbor strong intuitions that society need 
not honor such claims. One argument in favor of collective support 
for caretakers and their charges holds that parents, through their 
children, generate a “public good” that confers uncompensated 
benefits on the public as a whole.15 Alternatively, Anne Alstott of 
Yale Law School argues that because society’s obligations to children 
can only be properly discharged if parents provide intensive and 
continuous care, justice and pragmatism dictate that society support 
parents in fulfilling this obligation.16 Although there is limited 
political support for helping parents—as reflected, for example, in 
modest tax credits and childcare subsidies—most voters remain 
convinced that the primary responsibility for children must remain 
with their parents. That sentiment, combined with a dramatic 
movement of mothers into the labor force and social science data 
suggesting that single parenthood is detrimental to children, has 
turned the tide against no-strings-attached benefits for mothers of 
young children and in favor of expectations that they contribute to 
their own support through paid employment. 
Finally, the paradigm of conditional reciprocity has implications 
for the idea that is central to this conference: human dignity. The 
recent success of efforts to impose meaningful work requirements as a 
condition for receiving public aid both proceeds from, and also 
fosters, a renewed appreciation of the inherent dignity of work. 
Conditional reciprocity rests on the understanding that everyone must 
 
15. See NANCY FOLBRE, THE INVISIBLE HEART: ECONOMICS AND FAMILY VALUES 
53-82 (2001); Amy L. Wax, Something for Nothing: Liberal Justice and Welfare Work 
Requirements, 52 Emory L.J. 1 (2003). 
16. See generally ALSTOTT, supra note 9. 
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contribute something in order to receive something in return. That 
“something” may be humble or modest. But humility and modesty do 
not in themselves detract from worthiness for inclusion in the 
collective or for help when the chips are down. Even the performance 
of the lowest-skilled jobs—including jobs that are sometimes 
disparaged to the poor by “welfare rights” advocates as demeaning or 
“dead end”17—earns the community’s respect and is viewed as vital 
to its integrity. 
 The logic of conditional reciprocity also suggests that a dignified 
existence is one that balances dependence and independence, 
competition and cooperation. Human dignity is not a matter of 
extremes and is no more achieved through complete self-sufficiency 
than through abject and idle dependency. “Self-sufficiency,” taken at 
its word, conjures up the Hobbesian nightmare of the suspicious 
hermit, with a life solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short. 
Cooperation is the watchword of successful societies everywhere, and 
no one fails to benefit from the efforts, work, generosity, and good 
will of myriad others. The crux of a dignified existence is thus not 
“independence,” but a constructive dependency that abides by well-
recognized rules of conduct—rules that include a reluctance to engage 
in needless exploitation of others. The better and more accurate term 
is “interdependency,” which suggests mutual and consensual support 
and contribution. To be sure, the institutional structures that best 
strike the balance between dependence and independence are not 
always obvious and vary under different conditions and 
circumstances. The creation of these structures is a political work in 
progress. Yet the fundamental paradigm is robust. The idea of 
conditional reciprocal obligation retains a remarkably tenacious grip 
on ordinary hearts and minds. It sheds a good deal of light on our 
feelings and attitudes towards those less fortunate and helps explain 
why we are sometimes willing to help and why that willingness 
sometimes runs out. It also offers guidance for the poor themselves 
and points their way towards the dignified existence that so often 
eludes them. 
 
17. MYRON MAGNET, THE DREAM AND THE NIGHTMARE: THE SIXTIES’ LEGACY 
TO THE UNDERCLASS (1993); LAWRENCE M. MEAD, BEYOND ENTITLEMENT: THE SOCIAL 
OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP (1986). 
